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2111 
RULE 10B-5(B) ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN 
LIGHT OF JANUS:  MAKING THE CASE 
FOR AGENCY DEFERENCE 
Matthew P. Wynne* 
 
This Note addresses whether the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders applies to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and, if not, whether the SEC’s 
own interpretation of Rule 10b-5 should be entitled to deference in future 
SEC enforcement actions.  Since its promulgation in 1942, Rule 10b-5 has 
been the subject of much debate, particularly regarding the scope of the 
private right of action that courts have interpreted the rule to imply.  
Having acknowledged that an implied right exists, the Supreme Court 
quickly began to limit Rule 10b-5 claims of private plaintiffs, citing concern 
over expanding a right of action not grounded in a statute or regulation.  In 
contrast, the Court has instructed lower courts to construe Rule 10b-5 “not 
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes” when dealing with SEC cases.  In Janus—the latest curtailment 
of the private Rule 10b-5 action—the Court held that a defendant must have 
ultimate authority over a statement to make a misstatement with it that 
violates Rule 10b-5(b).  Among other justifications, the Court reemphasized 
its concern over expanding the implied private right of action without 
congressional authorization.  Today, confusion abounds in the lower courts 
about whether the Court’s narrow interpretation applies to all Rule 10b-5 
actions (including those brought by the SEC) or merely to private civil suits 
(as in Janus). 
This Note contends that the underlying rationale for the Court’s Janus 
decision is not applicable to SEC enforcement actions.  While the Court’s 
decision may fit the particular circumstances of Janus, the policy 
considerations cited by the Court do not apply to the SEC, and, therefore, 
the Court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 10b-5 should not apply to actions 
brought by the SEC.  Assuming Janus does not apply, this Note contends 
that the SEC’s pre-Janus interpretation would withstand Chevron-style 
analysis of an agency interpretation and is therefore entitled to substantial 
judicial deference in future enforcement actions. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.B.A., 2008, University of 
Notre Dame.  I would like to thank Caitlin, my family, and my friends for their 
encouragement and support throughout this process.  I am also grateful to my advisor, 
Professor Clare Huntington, for her advice and guidance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“To make,” or not “to make”:  that is the question.1  Although 
Shakespeare surely did not contemplate the complexity of federal securities 
laws or mutual fund structures when he wrote his famous line, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently attempted to answer a pressing question for actors 
in the capital markets:  What does it take “to make” a materially misleading 
statement such that one is primarily liable for a violation of Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5(b)?2 
Imagine that a mutual fund advisor creates a fund for investors who own 
the fund entirely.3  The advisor, under a management agreement with the 
fund, controls the day-to-day operations of the fund.  All the officers of the 
fund are employees of the advisor.  As a separate legal entity, the fund has a 
board of directors, all of whom are independent from the advisor except for 
one.  The advisor, being in the best position to do so, provides all the 
information for the fund’s prospectus, chiefly, that the fund is not suitable 
for market timing trading strategies.  Separately, and unbeknownst to the 
fund’s board, the advisor has entered into secret arrangements with third 
parties to permit market timing in the fund.  Having no reason to suspect 
inaccuracies in the advisor’s information, the board approves the 
prospectus.  The advisor then distributes the prospectus to potential 
investors.  A state regulator uncovers the misstatement, causing the fund’s 
investors to flee.  With the loss of assets under management, the fees 
collected by the advisor (and ultimately its publicly traded parent) plummet.  
The stock price of the parent drops.  Shareholders of the parent company 
sue the advisor for the misstatement.  Can the advisor be primarily liable for 
making those misstatements in the fund’s prospectus?  Would the answer 
change if the SEC were the plaintiff instead of a private party? 
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivate Traders,4 a private 
securities lawsuit, the Supreme Court addressed the first question but failed 
to answer the second.  The Court severely curtailed the scope of Rule 10b-
5(b), holding that one must have “ultimate authority” over a statement in 
 
 1. Apologies to William Shakespeare. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 
1 (“To be, or not to be:  that is the question.”). 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012).  For the full text of the rule, see infra text 
accompanying note 22. 
 3. This hypothetical is based, at a high level, on the facts of Janus Capital Group, Inc. 
v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  For a more complete description of 
Janus, see infra Part I.A.3.a. 
 4. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
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order “to make” a material misstatement with it.5  The advisor in the above 
hypothetical, Janus Capital Management (JCM), did not have “ultimate 
authority,” and thus could not be primarily liable.6  The fund and its board 
lacked the requisite scienter for primary liability.7  As a result, no party was 
held liable for the misstatement that caused the plaintiff’s loss. 
The Court, however, did not clearly articulate the reach of its holding.  
Because the facts and procedural stance of Janus are unique, lower courts 
have struggled to determine when the ultimate authority test applies and to 
whom it applies to.  Specifically, courts are wrestling over whether Janus 
applies to SEC enforcement actions—indeed, the SEC itself is unsure.8 
In Janus, the Court rejected the SEC’s position, set forth in an amicus 
brief, which argued for a broader interpretation of Rule 10b-5.9  
Nonetheless, the Court did not explicitly state that the holding applied to 
SEC enforcement actions, and language in the opinion indicates it may not.  
Since the Janus decision, the SEC has generally avoided the question and 
pursued enforcement actions against defendants lacking “ultimate 
authority” either by charging them with aiding and abetting the primary 
actor’s 10b-5(b) violation10 or by pursuing other provisions imposing 
liability.11  Although this strategy has been somewhat effective, the 
secondary liability approach only works if there is a separate primary 
violator to aid and abet. 
In the face of the Court’s limitation on private securities litigation, many 
simply assumed that Janus applied to all Rule 10b-5 cases.  Justice Thomas 
went to great lengths, however—both before and after stating the Court’s 
holding—to explain that the private right of action must be construed 
narrowly because it was implied in the statute.  Although the facts, 
procedural stance, and policy reasons identified in Janus may have 
rightfully compelled the Court’s decision, such a limitation on Rule 10b-5 
should not sweep so broadly as to incorporate cases where these facts and 
 
 5. Id. at 2302. 
 6. Id. at 2302, 2304. 
 7. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 8. See Yin Wilczek, Extent to Which Janus Applies to SEC Actions Not Clear, Official 
Says, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 462 (March 5, 2012) (according to SEC Deputy 
Solicitor John Avery, “It is ‘not clear’ whether the decision covers SEC actions.”). 
 9. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303–04 & n.8. 
 10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) 
(“[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another 
person in violation of a provision of this chapter . . . shall be deemed to be in violation of 
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.”). 
 11. For example, see SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., No.6:09-cv-1963-Orl-
28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012), which was in progress when the Janus 
decision was handed down.  The SEC withdrew its primary liability claims against some 
defendants under Rule 10b-5 and added claims that the defendants instead aided and abetted 
other primary violators. Id. at *2; see also Jean Eaglesham, At SEC, Strategy Changes 
Course, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2011, at C1; Yin Wilczek, SEC Looking to Aiding/Abetting 
Claims in Wake of Janus Decision, Official Says, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 457 (March 
5, 2012). 
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policy considerations are not present.  Specifically, Janus should not apply 
to SEC enforcement actions. 
This Note will argue that the Janus decision is limited to private 
securities litigation and does not apply to Rule 10b-5(b) SEC enforcement 
actions.  Additionally, the SEC’s interpretation of the Rule, arguing for a 
“creation” standard, is reasonable.  Since the Court’s 1945 decision in 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,12 the Court has given an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation “controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous.”13  While the Court has refined the “Seminole Rock deference” 
standard over the years, it has reaffirmed the underlying principle in recent 
cases.14  Therefore, courts should defer to the SEC’s reasonable 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) in future SEC enforcement actions. 
Part I of this Note will first provide a background discussion of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the 
SEC’s enforcement authority.  Next, Part I will provide background on the 
history of private actions under Rule 10b-5, ending with a discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus.  Last, it will discuss the 
background of agency deference in general and as it applies to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation. 
Part II will first discuss whether Janus applies to the SEC, reviewing the 
Janus decision itself as well as subsequent lower court decisions.  Part II 
will then discuss whether the SEC’s interpretation should be entitled to 
judicial deference if Janus does not apply.  This will include a discussion of 
the competing interpretations of Rule 10b-5 expressed in pre-Janus cases, 
the Janus majority, the Janus dissent, and the SEC’s amicus brief in Janus. 
Part III will argue that Janus was indeed limited to private actions and 
does not apply in SEC enforcement actions.  Finally, it will argue that the 
SEC’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) is reasonable and a permissible 
construction of the Rule, satisfying the concerns expressed by the Janus 
court while allowing the SEC to carry out its essential task of protecting 
investors.  Therefore, the SEC’s interpretation should be entitled to 
substantial deference from courts in future enforcement actions. 
I.  THE BEGINNINGS:  SECURITIES LAWS AND AGENCY DEFERENCE 
This part provides a brief history of the securities laws and regulations 
underlying the Janus case, as well as an overview of the bedrock principles 
of agency deference found in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Part I.A 
briefly surveys the circumstances leading to the federalization of securities 
laws, the relevant securities laws and regulations, and the SEC’s authority 
 
 12. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 13. Id. at 414. 
 14. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 
512 U.S. 504 (1994). See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole 
Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449 (2011) (surveying the current scope of 
Seminole Rock deference). 
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to enforce them.  Part I.A concludes with a brief history of the private right 
of action under Rule 10b-5, up to and including the Janus case. 
Part II.B then lays out the oft-cited Chevron analysis, which courts apply 
to determine when to defer to a federal administrative agency’s 
interpretation of a statute.  Part II.B then describes an analogous line of 
cases defining Seminole Rock deference, which dictates when a court 
should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.  Finally 
Part II.B concludes by introducing the potential interaction of agency 
deference with stare decisis. 
A.  History of Relevant Securities Laws 
This section describes the development of federal securities laws, the 
history of SEC Rule 10b-5, and the SEC’s enforcement authority.  It then 
provides a brief history of the Rule 10b-5 private action and concludes with 
a discussion of the Janus case. 
1.  History of SEC Rule 10b-5 
The history of federal securities law begins with the bull market of the 
1920s and the subsequent Great Depression, which was caused in part by 
the dramatic stock market crash of 1929.15  At the time, only a patchwork 
of state “blue sky laws” regulated the market for securities.16  Seizing on 
the moral and ethical failings of Wall Street at the time, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt used his New Deal platform to push for the restoration of 
investor confidence in the financial markets.17  In 1933, Congress passed 
the Securities Act18 (’33 Act), and, in the following year, the Securities 
Exchange Act19 (’34 Act), federalizing the regulation of securities.20  The 
combined purpose of the Acts was to prevent fraud and create full 
disclosure to allow investors to make informed decisions.21 
 
 15. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 407–08 (1990) (describing the process leading to enactment of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 16. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
§ 1.2[2] (6th ed. 2009). 
 17. Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 65–66 
(2009). 
 18. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77zzz (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).  The Securities Act requires issuers to 
register securities offerings with the SEC and to disclose material information in a securities 
registration statement and prospectus. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 2.0. 
 19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). See generally 1 LOUIS LOSS, 
JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 57–60 (6th 
ed. 2011) (providing an overview of the Acts). 
 20. See Colombo, supra note 17, at 65. 
 21. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984) (“[The Acts] had and still have two 
basic components:  a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure when 
securities are issued periodically thereafter.”); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 
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Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act provides, in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any 
securities-based swap agreement . . . any manipulative or deceptive device 
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.22 
Although the Acts explicitly listed numerous civil and criminal penalties, 
Congress recognized that a rigid statutory framework would impede the 
efficient regulation of securities trading.23  As part of the ’34 Act, Congress 
created the SEC24 and delegated to it an “arsenal of flexible enforcement 
powers,”25 including the power to promulgate rules and regulations to 
enforce the provisions of section 10(b).26 
In 1942, a company president in Boston was buying shares from his 
investors without disclosing to them the latest improved earnings.27  Milton 
Freeman, then an Assistant Solicitor at the SEC, was tasked with drafting a 
rule that would prohibit such activity.  Freeman quickly drafted a rule and 
presented it to the Commission the same day.  Without any hesitation, the 
Commission unanimously approved the rule.28  That rule, SEC Rule 10b-5, 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
 
U.S. 462 (1977) (“[T]he fundamental purpose of the [’34] Act [is] ‘to substitute a philosophy 
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor. . . .’” (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens 
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972))). But see Thel, supra note 15, at 388–94 
(critiquing the Supreme Court’s conception of section 10(b) and offering an alternative 
view). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 23. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d.  The ’34 Act transferred to the SEC the administration of the 
’33 Act, formerly administered by the Federal Trade Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.1 
(2012). 
 25. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195. 
 26. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (making it unlawful to act “in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors”). 
 27. See Milton V. Freeman, Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1 (1993). 
 28. See id. at S1–S2; see also Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. 
LAW. 891, 922 (1967) (recounting Commissioner Sumner Pike, the only person to say 
anything at the meeting, stating:  “Well, we are against fraud, aren’t we?”). 
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in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.29   
This rule has not changed since 1942.  Section 10(b) has been characterized 
as a “catchall,”30 and Rule 10b-5, similarly, as “a sort of long-arm provision 
in which the SEC forbids everything the statute gives it power to forbid.”31  
The language of Rule 10b-5 has also been praised as open-ended and 
adaptable, allowing a degree of flexibility to reach new schemes and 
tactics.32 
2.  SEC Enforcement Authority 
The SEC consists of five Commissioners, appointed by the President, 
who collectively oversee five separate divisions, including a Division of 
Enforcement.33  Section 21 of the ’34 Act authorizes the SEC to enforce the 
Acts.34  This authority includes the express power to enforce the rules and 
regulations promulgated by the Commission under the ’34 Act—
specifically, Rule 10b-5.35  In its enforcement role, the SEC is a “statutory 
guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the 
securities laws.”36  The SEC’s enforcement decisions must balance the 
multidimensional nature of the SEC’s mission of protecting investors; 
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital 
formation.37 
The SEC has several options and venues available to carry out its 
enforcement duties.38  First, the SEC has the power to bring actions in 
federal court to seek temporary and permanent injunctive relief against 
possible violators,39 to request that a court prohibit persons from serving as 
officers or directors of registered companies,40 to seek civil monetary 
 
 29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 30. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is aptly 
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”). 
 31. Thel, supra note 15, at 462–63; see Colombo, supra note 17, at 66 (“Rule 10b-5 
attempts to circumscribe the widest range of conduct subject to prohibition under § 10(b) by 
broadly enjoining any fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”). 
 32. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 As an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. S19–S21 (1993) (describing the benefits of the ambiguity of Rule 10b-5’s language). 
 33. See About the SEC:  What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter About the SEC]. 
 34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2006). 
 35. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78–79 
(2006); see also Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission:  A Critical 
Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 371 (2008) (listing the federal securities laws that the SEC is tasked 
with enforcing). 
 36. SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 37. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 35, at 369. 
 38. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u; 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2012).  For a general overview of 
available enforcement options, see 1 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.4[6]. 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1). 
 40. Id. § 78u(d)(2). 
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penalties for securities law violations,41 and to request equitable relief.42  
Second, the SEC can bring administrative action against alleged violators.43  
In these administrative proceedings, the SEC may impose monetary 
penalties after notice and opportunity for a hearing.44  An administrative 
law judge (ALJ), who is independent of the SEC, presides over these 
hearings.45  The ALJ issues an initial decision, which can be appealed to the 
Commission.46  The Commission’s decision can be appealed to federal 
circuit courts.47  Third, the SEC can refer cases to the Department of Justice 
for criminal prosecution.48 
3.  A Brief Overview of the Private Right of Action Under Rule 10b-5 
The ’34 Act does not explicitly provide for a private right of action under 
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, whereby a private citizen (as opposed to a 
government agency) may bring a civil action against a violator in court.49  
Nevertheless, soon after the SEC first promulgated the rule, federal district 
courts, starting in 1946 with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,50 began 
finding an implied private remedy for Rule 10b-5 violations.51  However, 
the Supreme Court did not officially recognize this implied right of action 
in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until 1971.52 
Following the Court’s recognition, Rule 10b-5 became a popular and 
powerful tool for the securities plaintiff’s bar.53  Besides their popularity, 
private actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “play a vital role in 
protecting the integrity of our securities markets.”54  The combination of 
SEC enforcement efforts and private rights of action under federal securities 
laws helps to provide a “high level of investor confidence in the integrity 
and efficiency of our markets.”55  As an Associate Justice, William H. 
 
 41. Id. § 78u(d)(3). 
 42. Id. § 78u(d)(5). 
 43. Id. §§ 78u-2, 78d-1 (delegation to ALJ). 
 44. Id. § 78u-2(a). 
 45. See About the SEC, supra note 33. 
 46. See id. 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); see Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/alj.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 48. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.4[6]. 
 49. See Colombo, supra note 17, at 67. 
 50. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 51. Id. at 513–14. 
 52. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is 
now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”). 
 53. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 12.3[3], at 528 (“[T]here are hundreds of reported 
cases each year involving the rule.”). 
 54. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 174 (2008). 
 55. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687 (providing 
background for the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995); see also Bateman 
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (“[W]e repeatedly have 
emphasized that implied private actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the 
enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a necessary supplement to Commission action.’” 
(citations omitted) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))). 
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Rehnquist once referred to the Rule as a “judicial oak which has grown 
from little more than a legislative acorn.”56 
Only four years after recognition of the implied right, however, the Court 
began, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,57 to express reservations 
about continuing to imply a private right not grounded in any tangible 
congressional intent.58  Later, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver,59 the Supreme Court held that private civil liability under 
Rule 10b-5 did not extend to those who only aided and abetted the 
manipulative practice but did not themselves engage in the violation.60  The 
Court held that the implied right of action did not extend beyond the 
language of the statute.61 
Soon thereafter, fearing that Central Bank might also preclude the SEC 
from bringing aiding and abetting charges, Congress passed the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).62  The PSLRA 
explicitly amended the ’34 Act to authorize the SEC to bring actions against 
persons who aid and abet securities violations63 but did not include a 
provision authorizing private suits for similar conduct.64 
In Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,65 the Court 
sought to clarify the now important distinction between primary and 
secondary liability.  In that case, the defendants, Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola, knowingly falsified contracts with Charter Communications, who 
then used those contracts to falsify its own financial statements.66  Charter 
was the undisputed primary violator of Rule 10b-5, but the private-party 
plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants liable as well.67  The Court 
acknowledged that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive,”68 but the plaintiffs 
could not establish reliance, an essential element in a private Rule 10b-5 
action, because the defendants’ statements were never actually made to the 
plaintiffs.69  Additionally, none of the defendants’ acts made it “necessary 
or inevitable” that Charter would fraudulently record the transactions as it 
 
 56. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 57. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 58. Id. at 737 (“When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5 . . . it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the [SEC] in 1942 foreordained the 
present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5.”). 
 59. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 60. Id. at 191. 
 61. Id. (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold that a 
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”). 
 62. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 104 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 63. Id. § 104 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)). 
 64. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 
(2008); Colombo, supra note 17, at 78. 
 65. 552 U.S. 148. 
 66. Id. at 153–55. 
 67. Id. at 155. 
 68. Id. at 158. 
 69. Id. at 159. 
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did.70  Lastly, acknowledging judicial creation of the private right of action, 
the Court cautioned against its expansion.71 
Most recently, the Court further narrowed the scope of private Rule 10b-
5 actions in Janus.  The next section will provide background on mutual 
funds relevant to the Janus case. 
a.  Background on Mutual Funds 
The Janus case involved misrepresentations in the prospectus of a mutual 
fund.  This section will provide a brief background on mutual funds, their 
structure, how they are managed, and how they are regulated.  The next 
section will cover the specific facts of Janus. 
A mutual fund, in general, is a legal entity that pools money from 
investors and invests in a portfolio of securities.72  The fund is created by a 
sponsor, which contracts with the fund, often through a subsidiary, to 
provide subsequent operational management of the fund.73  The fund is 
owned entirely by investors who purchase shares in the fund, with each 
share representing proportionate ownership of the fund’s portfolio of 
securities.74  As a stand-alone legal entity, mutual funds have their own 
board of directors, distinct from the sponsor or its subsidiaries.75  The 
primary role of the fund’s board of directors is to oversee the delegation of 
management to the contracted manager.76  The sponsor or its subsidiary, 
through its management contract with the fund, usually provides investment 
advisory, brokerage, and custodial services for the fund, among other 
things.77  Mutual funds rarely have their own employees and are therefore 
externally managed and operated by the sponsor or its subsidiary.  This 
contractual manager is often referred to as an investment advisor or 
management company.78  The management company is typically paid a 
percentage of the assets under management held in the fund and does not 
share directly in the gains and losses of the fund’s investments.79  To attract 
investors, mutual funds issue a prospectus, which details the fund’s 
investment strategy, objectives, fees, expenses, risks, and methods for 
purchasing or redeeming shares, among other things.80 
 
 70. Id. at 161. 
 71. Id. at 165 (“Concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution 
against expansion.  The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us.”). 
 72. ROBERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL FUND BUSINESS 16 (Sandra D. Crane ed., 1998). 
 73. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual 
Funds:  Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1019 (2005). 
 74. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 17. 
 75. See id. at 4. 
 76. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 1020. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 4. 
 79. See id. at 6; see also Langevoort, supra note 73, at 1020. 
 80. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 20. 
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In addition to the ’33 Act and ’34 Act, mutual funds are subject to 
additional federal laws that specifically address investment companies and 
their advisors.  The Investment Company Act of 194081 requires all funds to 
register with the SEC and follow certain operating standards.82  The fund’s 
advisor is also subject to the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.83  Lastly, 
the ’33 Act requires specific disclosures by the fund, and the ’34 Act sets 
out antifraud provisions regarding the purchase and sale of fund shares.84 
b.  The Facts of Janus 
First Derivative Traders, the lead plaintiff in this class-action suit, 
represented shareholders of Janus Capital Group (JCG).  First Derivative 
sued JCG and its wholly owned subsidiary Janus Capital Management 
(JCM) for alleged misstatements in the prospectus of Janus Investment 
Fund (JIF).85  JCM and JCG, the sponsors, had created JIF, a mutual fund, 
as a separate legal entity owned entirely by investors.86  JIF contractually 
retained JCM to be its investment advisor, underwriter, and administrator.87  
All JIF employees were also officers of JCM, but only one member of JIF’s 
board was associated with JCM.88 
Seeking to attract investors, JIF issued prospectuses that detailed the 
investment strategy and operation of its mutual funds.89  The prospectuses 
for several funds stated that the mutual funds were not suitable for market 
timing trading strategies.90  Shortly thereafter, the New York Attorney 
General filed a complaint against JCG and JCM, alleging that JCG entered 
into secret arrangements to permit market timing in certain funds managed 
by JCM, contrary to the disclosures in the JIF prospectus.91  Following the 
Attorney General’s complaint, JIF fund investors withdrew substantial 
amounts of money from JIF.92  JCM earned money from JIF based on JIF’s 
assets under management, so the decrease in JIF’s assets reduced JCM’s 
advisory revenues, which in turn decreased revenues for JCM’s parent, 
JCG.93  First Derivative, a JCG shareholder, alleged that if the truth had 
been known about permitting market timing strategies, the Janus mutual 
 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006). 
 82. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 21. 
 83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21; see Pozen, supra note 72, at 21. 
 84. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 21. 
 85. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301–02 
(2011). 
 86. Id. at 2299. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 2299–2300. 
 89. Id. at 2300. 
 90. Id.  Market timing, while not illegal, id., is “an investment strategy by which 
sophisticated short-term traders take advantage of delays in the pricing of mutual funds, to 
the detriment of other fund investors.” Norman S. Poser, The Supreme Court’s Janus Capital 
Case, 44 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 205, 205 (2011). 
 91. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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funds would have been less attractive to investors, thus reducing the price 
of JCG stock that the plaintiffs would have paid to purchase it.94 
First Derivative alleged that JCM “caused mutual fund prospectuses to be 
issued for Janus mutual funds and made them available to the investing 
public, which created the misleading impression that [JCG and JCM] would 
implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus [mutual funds].”95  
The District of Maryland dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim.96  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that “JCG and 
JCM, by participating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, 
made the misleading statements contained in the documents.”97  The Fourth 
Circuit also held that investors could infer that JCM “played a role in 
preparing or approving the content of the Janus fund prospectuses.”98 
c.  The Janus Holding 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether JCM could be 
held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements 
included in JIF prospectuses.99 
The Supreme Court held that, “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker 
of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the 
statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate 
it.”100  The board of JIF had final approval of the prospectus.  Therefore, 
JCM—which had provided substantive information for the fund’s 
prospectus, drafted the misstated prospectus, and distributed it—did not 
“make” a false statement under Rule 10b-5(b) because the fund, JIF, and 
not the advisor, JCM, had “ultimate authority” over the prospectus.101 
d.  The SEC’s Amicus Brief 
The SEC filed an amicus brief102 contending that, for purposes of Rule 
10b-5(b), “make” should be defined as “create.”103  The SEC argued that its 
position was “controlling” as long as it the interpretation was not “plainly 
 
 94. Id. at 2300–01. 
 95. Id. at 2300. 
 96. Id. at 2301 (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d, 618, 620 (D. Md. 
2007), rev’d, 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)). 
 97. Id. at 2301 (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)). 
 98. Id. (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 127 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d 
sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2302.  For a full discussion of the conflicting interpretations of “to make,” see 
infra Part II.B.3. 
 101. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 102. Brief for United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Janus, 131 S. Ct. 
2296,(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339892 [hereinafter SEC Janus Brief]. 
 103. Id. at 12–17. 
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erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”104  The Court was quick to 
dismiss the SEC’s position, noting that the Commission was not entitled to 
deference where the meaning of the rule was not ambiguous and expressed 
skepticism over affording deference to the SEC in a private right of action 
to which the SEC was not a party.105  The Janus majority opinion, and its 
conflict with the dissenting Justices and SEC, will be discussed in greater 
detail in Part II. 
B.  Agency Deference 
Federal administrative agencies are tasked with carrying into effect the 
will of congressional statutes.106  Agency duties vary, but generally include 
promulgating rules based on such statutes and enforcing both the statutes 
and rules.107  This frequently requires the interpretation of imprecise or 
unclear statutes and regulations.108  Often, the agency’s interpretation might 
be a choice between reasonable alternatives, even where one interpretation 
might appear “better” than another to those outside the agency.109  
Nonetheless, for decades, courts have shown varying degrees of deference 
to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes, rules, and regulations. 
This Note will focus on judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulation.  However, it is important first to understand the 
underlying rationale for agency deference,110 articulated by the Supreme 
Court in the seminal case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.111  After discussing the basic principles, this section 
will narrow its focus to deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
rule, as laid out first in Seminole Rock112 and more recently reaffirmed in 
Auer v. Robbins.113 
 
 104. Id. at 13–14 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
 105. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8 (“[W]e have previously expressed skepticism over the 
degree to which the SEC should receive deference regarding the private right of action. . . .  
[T]he SEC’s presumed expertise ‘is of limited value’ when analyzing ‘whether a cause of 
action should be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular class of litigants.’ 
This also is not the first time this Court has disagreed with the SEC’s broad view of § 10(b) 
or Rule 10b-5.” (citations omitted)). 
 106. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
358–60 (2010) (providing an introduction to the federal administrative state). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 703–06 (1991). 
 110. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 619 (1996) (“Although Seminole 
Rock preceded Chevron by almost four decades, the Court in Seminole Rock did not offer 
any detailed rationale for binding deference.  When the Supreme Court finally supplied a 
substantial explanation for Seminole Rock deference, it incorporated Chevron’s more fully 
developed premises.”). 
 111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 112. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 113. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
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1.  Chevron Deference 
Chevron deference is commonly understood to include two “steps.”114  
Chevron Step One asks “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”115  If Congress’s intent is clear, the inquiry ends 
because the court, as well as the agency, must follow the “unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”116  If Congress has not directly addressed the 
issue, however, the court does not impose its own construction of the 
statute,117 rather, it moves to Chevron Step Two. 
If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, Step Two requires the 
court to ask “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”118  To administer the congressional scheme, 
agencies must formulate policy and promulgate rules to fill the gaps left by 
Congress.119 
There are two types of delegation gaps:  explicit and implicit.120  Certain 
statutes may be explicit (e.g., “The SEC shall define X”) or implicit (e.g., 
“The SEC shall have the authority to make regulations to enforce this 
provision”).  With an express delegation, agency interpretations are given 
controlling weight unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”121  With an implicit delegation, a court may not 
substitute its own construction for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
agency.122 
While the Chevron analysis has remained consistent, a question 
eventually arose as to when this analysis should apply.  The Court 
attempted to answer that question in United States v. Mead Corp.123  The 
Court’s answer has been referred to as “Chevron Step Zero.”124 
In Mead, the Court noted that there were times when Congress did not 
intend to delegate authority to an agency to fill a gap.125  In those cases, 
Chevron deference would not apply, and a court should instead consider 
 
 114. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (providing a detailed overview of the scope of Chevron deference 
leading up to United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001), which was decided shortly after 
the article’s publication). 
 115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 116. Id. at 842–43. 
 117. Id. at 844. 
 118. Id. at 843. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 843–44. 
 121. Id. at 844; see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2006). 
 122. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of 
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not 
disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation 
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 
374, 382, 383 (1961))). 
 123. 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (“We granted certiorari . . . in order to consider the limits 
of Chevron deference owed to administrative practice in applying a statute.”). 
 124. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 125. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–39. 
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applying a less deferential form of “Skidmore126 deference,” a pre-Chevron 
standard.127  The court should only apply Chevron deference when 
Congress expresses intent to delegate rulemaking authority, either explicitly 
or implicitly.128  A good indicator of such intent is “express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that 
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”129  The 
Court noted that such formalized procedures “foster the fairness and 
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement” with the force of law.130  
Thus, Chevron Step Zero requires judicial review of the process that 
yielded the agency interpretation demanding deference before proceeding 
through the traditional Chevron two-step analysis.131 
2.  Chevron’s Cousin:  Seminole Rock Deference for an Agency’s 
Interpretation of Its Own Regulation 
The Supreme Court has long recognized strong judicial deference toward 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.  This form of deference—
developed separately from the Chevron line of cases—is commonly 
referred to as Seminole Rock deference.132  In Seminole Rock, the Court 
held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation “becomes of 
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”133 
Despite the different lines of cases, there are substantial parallels between 
the two doctrines.134  Both are grounded in a form of implied delegation.135  
Both provide for “mandatory” deference in that an agency’s interpretation is 
controlling, so long as it is a permissible construction.136  Accordingly, 
 
 126. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). 
 127. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228, 235. 
 128. Id. at 229. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 230 (“Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron 
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication.”). 
 131. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 
(2005) (“Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for evaluating whether an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute is lawful.”). 
 132. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114, at 899. 
 133. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). See generally 
Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations:  The Deference 
Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587 (1984). 
 134. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114, at 899; see also Manning, supra note 110, 
at 627. 
 135. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114, at 899. 
 136. See id.; see also Manning, supra note 110, at 627. 
 2013] MAKING THE CASE FOR AGENCY DEFERENCE 2127 
Seminole Rock deference has been referred to as the “cousin” of Chevron 
Step Two.137 
There are three primary justifications for Seminole Rock deference.  First, 
the Court has highlighted concerns for political accountability in such 
decisions, because they often entail policy judgments.138  Second, the 
agency’s relative expertise favors binding deference to agency 
interpretations of regulations.139  Third (and distinct from Chevron), the 
agency has unique and “superior competence to understand and explain its 
own regulatory text.”140  The agency is in a better position to use its 
historical familiarity with the reasons for adopting the text to reconstruct the 
purpose of the regulation.141 
Over the years, the doctrine has been refined but remains largely intact.  
An agency’s construction of its own regulation is entitled to substantial 
deference, so long as the interpretation “sensibly conforms to the purpose 
and wording of the regulations.”142  An agency’s interpretation need not be 
the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards.143  A 
Court’s task is not to pick the interpretation that best serves the regulatory 
purpose;144 rather, a court must defer to the agency’s interpretation unless 
an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by 
other indicators of the agency’s intent at the time the regulation was 
promulgated.145  Agencies are free to write regulations as broadly as they 
 
 137. See Victor L. Prial & Michael Kruse, Administrative Law, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
637, 637–38 (2008) (calling Seminole Rock deference “Chevron’s less widely known 
cousin”); see also John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:  Judicial Review of 
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 59 (2003) 
(“Although this formulation differs in words, it seems in practice to be indistinguishable 
from Chevron’s step two.”). 
 138. See Manning, supra note 110, at 629; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 
(1991)) (noting that deference is “all the more warranted” where the agency action requires 
judgment grounded in policy concerns); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (referencing an agency’s unique policymaking 
prerogatives). 
 139. See Manning, supra note 110, at 629–30; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. 
at 512 (“This broad deference is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation 
concerns ‘a complex and highly technical regulatory program’ . . . .” (quoting Pauley v. 
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)); Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (“[A]pplying an 
agency regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique 
expertise . . . .”). 
 140. See Manning, supra note 110, at 630; see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (“[W]e 
presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the 
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”). 
 141. See Manning, supra note 110, at 630; see also United States v. Cleveland Indians 
Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220 (2001) (“We need not decide whether the [informal] 
Revenue Rulings themselves are entitled to deference . . . .  [T]he Rulings simply reflect the 
agency’s longstanding interpretation of its own regulations.”). 
 142. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N. Ind. Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. Porter Cnty. Chapter of Izaak Walton League, Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975)). 
 143. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991). 
 144. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512. 
 145. Id. 
 2128 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
wish, so long as they conform to the boundaries of the statute; therefore, a 
rule of statutory interpretation that required an agency to construe its 
regulations narrowly “would make little sense.”146  Furthermore, agency 
interpretations put forth in amicus briefs can represent the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment.147  The Supreme Court has also suggested that an 
agency’s interpretations should receive even greater deference when the 
statute combines rulemaking and enforcement powers in one agency.148 
At times, the Court has limited when such deference should be accorded.  
In Mead, the Court required a more formalized process in order to receive 
Chevron deference.149  Mead may apply to Seminole Rock deference in that 
a court would require evidence of a formalized process for agency 
interpretations before deferring to the agency.150 
The combination of Seminole Rock deference and the interpretive rule 
exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking has led to a line of 
restrictions on the doctrine known as an “antiplaceholder principle.”151  In 
general, courts are wary of an agency’s ability to quickly promulgate vague 
regulations that receive little objection in notice-and-comment periods and 
then implement their true policy through subsequent interpretations.152 
Along those lines, courts have warned that they will not defer to an 
agency interpretation when the underlying rule is so vague as to be 
meaningless or, in other words, when an agency “promulgate[s] mush.”153  
Furthermore, the Court held in Gonzales v. Oregon154 that it would not treat 
an interpretive rule as an interpretation of the regulation if the regulation is 
merely “parroting” statutory language.155  Instead, courts will treat it as an 
informal interpretation of the statue, which requires only Skidmore 
deference under Mead.156  This “antiparroting” principle may only be 
designed, however, to prevent intentionally vague regulations that an 
agency may interpret as it sees fit later and then demand deference for such 
 
 146. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997). 
 147. Id. at 462 (“There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation [in an amicus 
brief filed by the agency] does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment . . . .”). 
 148. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–55 
(1991) (comparing the SEC’s unitary structure to the split structure set up under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act and analyzing the different Congressional purposes for 
doing so). 
 149. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1450–52. 
 151. See id. at 1467–72. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. at 1467 (citing Mission Grp. Kan., Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 781–83 (10th 
Cir. 1998); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584, 588 (D.C. Cir. 
1997)). 
 154. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 155. Id. at 257. 
 156. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1467–68. 
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interpretation.157  This was a major concern for the dissenting Justices in 
Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala158 and Mead.159 
How do the two lines of cases fit together then?  A regulation “must be 
consistent with the statute it implements”160 and cannot be interpreted more 
broadly than the statute itself.161  Thus, for an interpretation to receive 
Seminole Rock deference, a court must first determine if the agency 
regulation violates the statute, a straightforward Chevron question.162  Only 
then will Seminole Rock apply and determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation is consistent with the regulation.163 
3.  Reconciling Agency Deference with Stare Decisis 
Principles of agency deference, like those espoused in Chevron and 
Seminole Rock, are formal, interpretive guidelines backed by substantial 
judicial authority.164  Courts often interpret statutes or rules and create 
precedent, however, when no agency is involved.  When a court interprets a 
statute or rule, it declares to Congress and the public, “[T]his is what a 
statute means,” and this is what it will most likely mean in the future, 
barring a convincing need for change.165  In later cases, courts will 
generally adhere to this precedent and apply it to the case before them, 
following the principle known as stare decisis.166  The obligation to follow 
precedent recognizes that no judicial system could function properly if it 
approached each issue or case as one of first impression.167  Conversely, the 
outer limit of stare decisis is marked by the recognition that prior decisions 
can be clear errors and, if so, should no longer be followed.168  Thus, “stare 
decisis is not an inexorable command.”169  Rather, when a court examines a 
prior holding, “its judgment is customarily informed by a series of 
prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of 
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge 
 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 159. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Agencies will now have high incentive to rush out barebones, ambiguous rules construing 
statutory ambiguities, which they can then in turn further clarify through informal rulings 
entitled to judicial respect.”). 
 160. See Manning, supra note 110, at 627 n.78. 
 161. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (“[D]espite the 
broad view of . . . Rule [10b-5] advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot 
exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b).”). 
 162. See Manning, supra note 110, at 627 n.78. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis “Exception” to the Chevron 
Deference Rule, 44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 725 (1992). 
 165. See id. at 746–47. 
 166. See id. at 744; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare 
Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2237 (1997). 
 167. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”170  Like 
Chevron and Seminole Rock deference, stare decisis is a judicially crafted 
decision-making tool.171  Part II.B.2 discusses what happens when these 
two principles collide.172 
II.  THE TRANSITION:  THE POST-JANUS CONFLICT 
Now that the stage has been set, Part II of this Note will describe the 
conflict in the post-Janus realm of securities law.  First, does the Janus 
holding apply to an SEC Rule 10b-5 enforcement action?  Second, if it does 
not apply, should the SEC’s alternative interpretation of “to make” be 
entitled to judicial deference in a future enforcement action? 
A.  Does Janus Apply to SEC Enforcement Proceedings? 
The Janus Court did not specifically address whether its decision applied 
to all Rule 10b-5 actions, including SEC enforcement cases, or whether it 
was limited to the narrower class of private actions.  Some courts have 
applied Janus in subsequent SEC actions.  Conversely, others have 
expressed doubt about its application to SEC actions, and some have 
expressly stated it does not apply to SEC actions.  This section describes the 
post-Janus landscape where lower federal courts struggle to decide:  does 
Janus apply to SEC enforcement proceedings? 
1.  The Janus Opinion 
The Janus Court itself did not specifically address the scope of its 
holding.  Some language in the opinion appears to apply to Rule 10b-5 in 
general, which may be evidence of a broader application for all parties 
bringing a Rule 10b-5 action.  The wording of the holding, “[f]or purposes 
of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate 
authority over the statement,”173 seems to apply generally to Rule 10b-5, 
without consideration of the factual circumstances of its use.  The 
majority’s detailed grammar exercise174 is specific to the text of Rule 10b-
 
 170. Id. at 854–55 (“Thus, for example, [the Court] may ask whether the rule has proven 
to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind 
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add 
inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as 
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts 
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of 
significant application or justification.” (citations omitted)). 
 171. See White, supra note 164, at 747. 
 172. For a complete discussion on the collision of Chevron and stare decisis, see 
generally Pierce, supra note 166, and White, supra note 164.  While these articles discuss 
primarily Chevron deference, the principles, conflicts, and possible solutions are applicable 
to Seminole Rock deference. 
 173. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). 
 174. See infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
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5, focusing on the definition of “make” as used in the context of the rule.175  
Additionally, the Court declined to consider the SEC’s amicus brief in part 
because the meaning of the rule was not ambiguous.176  The Court also 
expressed concerns for disregarding the corporate form, noting that JCM 
and JIF were two separate legal entities.177  Last, the Court expressed 
concerns over blurring the line between primary and secondary liability 
because private litigants could pursue the former but not the latter.178 
Alternatively, the Janus Court’s opinion provides several indications that 
the holding is limited to private rights of action.  First, the Court was asked 
to decide the scope of liability in a private action under 10b-5.179  Second, 
the Court cited concerns—both before and after its holding—over 
expanding an implied right of action; thus, the Court felt obligated to 
construe the statute and rule narrowly.  After reaffirming the existence of 
the private action under Rule 10b-5, but before stating its holding, the Court 
noted: 
“[C]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution 
against its expansion.”  Thus, in analyzing whether JCM “made” the 
statements for purposes of Rule 10b-5, we are mindful that we must give 
“narrow dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize 
when it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the 
law.”180 
After explaining its holding, the Court once again asserted its desire to 
limit the scope of the implied private action:  “Our holding also accords 
with the narrow scope that we must give the implied private right of action. 
 
 175. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“The phrase at issue in Rule 10b-5, ‘[t]o make any . . . 
statement,’ is thus the approximate equivalent of ‘to state.’”); see also Elisse B. Walter, SEC 
Comm’r, Remarks Before the FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory & 
Compliance Professional Program (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov
/news/speech/2011/spch110811ebw.htm (“In its recent Janus decision, the Supreme Court 
focused simply on the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which of course apply to 
the Commission actions as well as private actions.  This . . . may have the unfortunate and 
ironic result of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.”). 
 176. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8; see Part II.B.1. 
 177. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (“We decline this invitation to disregard the corporate 
form.  Although First Derivative and its amici persuasively argue that investment advisers 
exercise significant influence over their client funds . . . it is undisputed that the corporate 
formalities were observed.”).  The Court also noted that if “control” were to form the basis 
of liability, Congress provided a separate provision, section 20(a) of the ’34 Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78t(a) (2006), for “[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable” 
for violations of securities laws. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (quoting section 20(a)). 
 178. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302, n.6 (“[F]or Central Bank to have any meaning, there must 
be some distinction between those who are primarily liable (and thus may be pursued in 
private suits) and those who are secondarily liable (and thus may not be pursued in private 
suits).”). 
 179. Id. at 2301 (“We granted certiorari to address whether JCM can be held liable in a 
private action under Rule 10b-5 . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 180. Id. at 2301–02 (citations omitted) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165, 167 (2008)). 
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. . .  [For the private right of action], we will not expand liability beyond the 
person or entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement.”181 
Beyond disagreeing with the “ultimate authority” rule announced by the 
majority, the dissent expressed concern for the consequences of applying 
this rule to the SEC going forward.182  Although the dissent did not offer its 
opinion on the scope of the holding, it hypothesized that, if the majority’s 
rule applied to the SEC, it would hamper the SEC’s ability to pursue 
secondary liability under sections 20(a) (control person liability) and 20(e) 
(aiding and abetting).183  Such secondary liability claims would fail because 
secondary liability requires a primary violator, and under the majority’s 
rule, none existed.184 
Notably, neither the majority nor dissent mentioned that the SEC indeed 
brought an enforcement action against JCM, which was settled.185  The 
SEC’s complaint did not invoke Rule 10b-5 but brought claims instead 
under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and Investment Company Act 
of 1940.186 
 
 181. Id. at 2303 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 167 (2008)). 
 182. See id. at 2310 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 183. Id. (“[U]nder the majority’s rule it seems unlikely that the SEC itself in such 
circumstances could exercise the authority Congress has granted it to pursue primary 
violators who ‘make’ false statements or the authority that Congress has specifically 
provided to prosecute aiders and abettors to securities violations. . . .  That is because the 
managers, not having ‘ma[d]e’ the statement, would not be liable as principals and there 
would be no other primary violator they might have tried to ‘aid’ or ‘abet.’” (alternation in 
original)). 
 184. Id.; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 n.2 (2010) (“Liability 
under § 20(a) is obviously derivative of liability under some other provision of the Exchange 
Act.”); SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 566 (2d Cir. 2009) (prosecution for aiding and 
abetting requires “substantial assistance” of a primary violation).  The dissent also postulated 
a hypothetical based on JCM duping the JIF board to make the misstatement: 
What is to happen when guilty management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing 
materially false statements and fools both board and public into believing they are true?  
Apparently under the majority’s rule, in such circumstances no one could be found to have 
‘ma[d]e’ a materially false statement—even though under common law the managers would 
likely have been guilty or liable . . . for doing so as principals (and not as aiders and 
abettors). 
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alternations in original); see Andrew 
Power, The Thirteenth Stroke:  An Approach to “Ultimate Authority” After Janus, 45 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1297, 1324 (2012); Colin Talia, Note, Janus Capital Group:  How 
“Making” a Statement Leads to Insulation from Liability, 38 J. CORP. L. 197, 210–16 (2012) 
(noting that the Janus decision might encourage companies to create corporate formalities to 
avoid liability and recommending possible legislative solutions). 
 185. See In re Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, SEC Release No. 2277, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26532, 83 SEC Docket 17666, 2004 WL 1845502 (Aug. 18, 2004); Janus 
Capital Management Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Settle SEC Fraud Charges for 
Undisclosed Market Timing Agreements, SEC News Digest, 2004-159 (Aug. 18, 2004), 
2004 WL 1842517, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/dig081804.txt. 
 186. See In re Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC., SEC Release No. 2277, 2004 WL 1842517, at 
*1. 
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2.  Lower Courts Since Janus 
Since the Janus decision, district courts have struggled to define the 
boundaries of the case’s reach.187  Some have applied Janus to SEC 
enforcement actions; others have refused to expand the holding beyond the 
private right of action. 
a.  Janus Does Apply to the SEC 
The broadest application of Janus appears to be SEC v. Kelly,188 in which 
the Southern District of New York not only applied Janus to an SEC Rule 
10b-5(b) enforcement action,189 but also extended the “ultimate authority” 
principle to sections (a) and (c) of the Rule 10b-5, as well as section 17(a) 
of the ’33 Act.190  These later sections address fraudulent schemes and 
deceptive practices but lack the operative phrase “to make” found in Rule 
10b-5(b).191 
In SEC v. Das,192 the District of Nebraska applied the Janus “ultimate 
authority” standard where defendants, CFOs who signed and certified the 
fraudulent statements, were clearly the “makers” of such statements.193  In 
another case, the Southern District of New York denied a motion to 
dismiss, finding that, even if Janus applied, the SEC had provided strong 
evidence that the defendant was the “maker” of the statements, thereby 
satisfying Janus.194  Shortly after the Janus decision, an ALJ applied Janus 
to an SEC enforcement proceeding over the objections of the SEC.195 
Some commentators agree that Janus applies to SEC enforcement 
actions.  One commentator reasoned that the Court’s decision is based on 
the text of Rule 10b-5, not merely policy considerations.196  Others have 
 
 187. See generally Edward B. Micheletti et al., Federal Court Application of Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2432 (Dec. 5, 
2011) (discussing the early cases applying Janus and demonstrating their inconsistency). 
 188. 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 189. Id. at 343. 
 190. See id. at 344–45. 
 191. See id. 
 192. No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011) 
 193. Id. at *6 (noting that the defendants “were the persons with ultimate authority and 
control over the content of the statements and whether and how they were communicated”). 
 194. SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Assuming arguendo 
that Janus’s holding applies to SEC enforcement actions, it does not require that the SEC’s 
claim against [the defendant] under Rule 10b-5 be dismissed . . . .”). 
 195. In re Flannery, SEC Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *34–35 (Oct. 28, 2011) 
(citing Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340) (initial decision). 
 196. See Bryan P. King, The Effects of an Undefined “Ultimate Authority” Standard for 
Rule 10b-5 Claims:  Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 16 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 405, 430 (2012) (“[T]he Court did not provide one definition of the word ‘make’ for 
private actions, and a separate definition for SEC actions.”). 
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noted that the SEC itself has conceded the point in certain cases197 and has 
failed in others to challenge the assertion198 that Janus does indeed apply. 
b.  Janus Does Not Apply to the SEC 
In contrast to the decisions discussed in the previous section, some 
district courts have refused to apply Janus to SEC enforcement actions and 
beyond Rule 10b-5(b).  In SEC v. Pentagon Capital Management PLC,199 
the Southern District of New York highlighted the difference between 
Janus (a private suit) and the case before it (an SEC enforcement action).200  
Private Rule 10b-5 suits require a narrow holding because they are implied 
in the statute, unlike SEC actions.201  The court highlighted the Janus 
Court’s emphasis on the need to narrow the scope of implied rights of 
action.202  Due to this important difference, “[t]here is no indication that the 
Court or Congress intended for actions brought by the SEC to be so 
limited.”203  In SEC v. Stoker,204 the Southern District of New York refused 
to apply Janus to an SEC enforcement action when the concerns over the 
implied right of action were not present.205  Last, several district courts 
have disagreed with Kelly’s expansion of Janus beyond Rule 10b-5(b), 
observing that Janus turned in part on interpreting “to make;” therefore, the 
scope of Janus’ holding could not include other antifraud misstatement 
provisions that lack this phrase.206 
 
 197. See Norman S. Poser, Janus Revisited:  The Lower Courts Wrestle with a Troubling 
Supreme Court Decision, 44 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 211, 215 (2012). 
 198. Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative 
Securities Jurisprudence 5 (Georgetown Pub. Law. & Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 12-
019, 2012) (citing Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2010745.  In certain cases where the court did not conclude that Janus applies, but 
nonetheless found that the defendant had the requisite “ultimate authority” if such a standard 
were to apply, the SEC in subsequent motions or appeals has not pushed the court to 
definitively apply or reject Janus’s applicability to enforcement actions. See, e.g., Page Proof 
Brief of the SEC, Appellee at 33, SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, No. 12-1680-cv (2d 
Cir. Nov. 9, 2012), 2012 WL 5829091 (“Because the record supports the district court’s 
finding that Defendants had the requisite ‘ultimate authority’ over the implied 
misrepresentations, this Court need not consider the alternative holding that Janus does not 
apply to Commission actions.”). 
 199. 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 200. Id. at 421–22; see also SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1963-
Orl-28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (“Janus . . . emphasized the 
difference between private actions and those brought by the SEC. . . .  [U]nlike Janus, this 
case was brought by the SEC rather than a private party.”). 
 201. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
 202. Id. (citing Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302, 
2303 (2011)). 
 203. Id. 
 204. 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 205. See id. at 465–66. 
 206. See SEC v. Sells, No. C 11-4941 CW, 2012 WL 3242551, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 
2012) (holding that Janus did not apply sections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5); SEC v. Big 
Apple Consulting USA, Inc. No. 6:09-cv-1963-Orl-28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512, at *3 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (refusing to apply Janus to section 17(a) of the ’33 Act, and noting that 
“the analysis in Janus closely focused on the ‘to make’ language in Rule 10b-5); Stoker, 865 
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3.  Other Distinguishing Features 
Courts often apply different standards to SEC Rule 10b-5 enforcement 
actions than they do to private actions for reasons going beyond the specific 
text of Rule 10b-5(b) at issue in Janus.  First, a private Rule 10b-5 plaintiff 
must establish more elements of a defendant’s violation compared to what 
the SEC must establish (e.g., the SEC need not prove reliance, economic 
loss, or loss causation).207  Second, the heightened pleading standards of the 
PSLRA208 may not be applicable to the SEC.209  Different requirements, 
such as not needing to prove reliance, allow the SEC to charge primary 
liability even when the statements in question are not attributed in public to 
the defendant.210  Similarly, courts may apply somewhat relaxed standards 
to SEC enforcement actions, despite claims based on the same statutory 
language, even in post-Janus cases.211 
 
F. Supp. 2d at 465 (refusing to apply Janus to section17(a) because “by means of” language 
of section 17(a) covers a broader range of activity than “to make” and the Janus Court 
emphasized the word “make”); Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 422 
(refusing to apply Janus to Rule 10b-5(a) & (c) because those sections “utilize[] different 
and broader operative language” than Rule 10b-5(b)); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 
5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“Janus may not 
be extended to statutes lacking the very language that Janus construed.”); SEC v. Daifotis, 
No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (holding that 
Janus does not apply to SEC claims brought pursuant to section 17(a), stating that 
“[i]mportantly, the word ‘make,’ which was the very thing the Supreme Court was 
interpreting in Janus, is absent from the operative language of Section 17(a)”). 
 207. Compare Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
157 (2008) (“In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”), with SEC v. 
Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) (Noting that, to prove a violation 
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC must establish that the defendant “(1) made a 
material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he had a duty to speak, or used 
a fraudulent device; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.”). 
 208. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006).  “The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to state with 
particularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing 
scienter . . . .” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
 209. See Sells, 2012 WL 3242551, at *8 (“[T]he SEC [is not] subject to the heightened 
pleading standard required by the PSLRA.”); Pentagon Capital Mgmt., 612 F. Supp 2d at 
263–64; SEC v. Dunn, 587 F. Supp. 2d. 486, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (not applying to the 
SEC). But see SEC v. Boling, Civ. A. No. 06-1329(RMC), 2007 WL 2059744, at *4 n.1 
(D.D.C. July 13, 2007) (applying PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard to the SEC). 
 210. See SEC v. KPMG, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 374–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“It is 
unnecessary, however, to decide whether primary liability could be imposed on the 
[defendants] on this basis in a private securities action.  The SEC, unlike a private plaintiff, 
is not required to prove reliance when it brings enforcement actions under the securities 
laws.  Accordingly, in an SEC enforcement action, there appears to be no reason to impose a 
requirement that a misstatement have been publicly attributed to a defendant for liability to 
attach, at least so long as the SEC is able to show that the defendant was sufficiently 
responsible for the statement—in effect, caused the statement to be made—and knew or had 
reason to know that the statement would be disseminated to investors.” (citations omitted)). 
 211. See Poser, supra note 197, at 215. 
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B.  Is the SEC’s Interpretation Entitled to Judicial Deference? 
Assuming Janus does not apply to SEC enforcement actions, should the 
SEC’s “creation” standard be entitled to deference in future enforcement 
actions?  This section takes the debate through a Chevron/Seminole Rock 
agency deference analysis.  First, it will analyze the congressional intent to 
delegate rulemaking and interpretative authority to the SEC, a 
Mead/Chevron Step Zero question.  Next, it will discuss competing views 
on whether the Supreme Court has spoken directly to application of the 
Janus standard to the SEC, a Chevron Step One analysis.  Finally, this 
section will analyze the competing interpretations of Rule 10b-5 found in 
pre-Janus case law, as well as Janus itself, including the majority opinion, 
dissenting opinion, and the SEC’s position.  This analysis assesses the 
reasonableness of the varying interpretations for purposes of Chevron Step 
Two. 
1.  Mead/Chevron Step Zero 
Under Mead, the first step of the interpretive analysis is to ask whether 
there is evidence of congressional intent to delegate rulemaking 
authority.212  The Mead Court listed several strong indicators of such intent, 
including “express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of 
rulemaking or adjudication.”213  In our inquiry, the question is whether 
Congress intended to delegate such authority to SEC interpretations (i.e., 
has the SEC’s interpretive process for Rule 10b-5 demonstrated the 
necessary “fairness and deliberation” to command Chevron style 
analysis?).214  Opponents could argue that the interpretations were not made 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking and are exactly the type of 
interpretations against which the dissenting justices in Mead and Thomas 
Jefferson University cautioned.215  In contrast, the SEC could argue that 
Congress specifically tasked it with authority to engage in rulemaking, 
enforcement, and adjudications, which necessarily require interpretation.216  
Therefore, Congress surely must have intended for the SEC to interpret its 
own rules in exercise of the delegated enforcement and adjudicatory 
powers.  In addition, the Court stated in Auer that an agency’s amicus brief 
reflected the agency’s fair and considered judgment and should be entitled 
to deference.217 
 
 212. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 217. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (“There is simply no reason to suspect 
that the interpretation [in an amicus brief filed by the agency] does not reflect the agency’s 
fair and considered judgment.”). 
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2.  Chevron Step One:  Did Congress or the Court Speak 
Directly to this Issue? 
Chevron Step One requires the court to ask whether Congress or the 
Supreme Court spoke directly to this issue.218  The Step One analysis 
requires a few additional inquiries, however, because the question at hand is 
dealing with an agency’s interpretation of a rule, which is itself an 
interpretation of a statute.219  A court should ask first whether the rule being 
interpreted is a practical construction of the statute.220  If the rule is indeed 
a practical construction of the statute, the next question is whether the rule 
speaks directly to the definition of “to make.”221  If not, the final Step One 
question is whether the Court has spoken directly to the issue (i.e., whether 
its interpretation of “to make” in Janus applies to the SEC).222 
Rule 10b-5 has been enforced and unchanged since its promulgation in 
1942.223  There should be no doubt that Rule 10b-5 is a permissible 
construction of section 10(b).  Accordingly, the analysis should then turn to 
Rule 10b-5 itself.224  Neither the text of section 10(b) nor that of Rule 10b-5 
defines “make” or expressly delegates authority to the SEC to define it.225 
In any event, the Janus Court ruled on the scope of Rule 10b-5, and 
Supreme Court precedent always trumps the deference owed under 
Chevron.226  The question then becomes:  Is this decision limited to private 
actions, creating no precedent for the SEC, or does it apply to all 
interpretations of Rule 10b-5—including SEC enforcement actions—
barring an alternative SEC interpretation under the principle of stare 
decisis? 
Questions arise then about what is precedent.227  Can the holding be 
isolated from the dicta?  Is it the rule, but not the underlying rationale?228  
The interaction of these two doctrines is far from settled, and the Supreme 
Court has even acknowledged that confusion abounds.229  It has been 
suggested that, to resolve this conflict, the court should first ask whether the 
statute or rule has spoken to the precise issue.230  If it has not, then the court 
 
 218. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
 222. See White, supra note 164, at 758. 
 223. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 29. 
 226. See Pierce, supra note 166, at 2226. 
 227. See White, supra note 164, at 757; see, e.g., Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 
10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576–97 
(1987). 
 228. See White, supra note 164, at 757–58. 
 229. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985 
(2005) (“There is genuine confusion in the lower courts over the interaction between the 
Chevron doctrine and stare decisis principles . . . .”).  Unfortunately, the Court did not go on 
to provide much clarity on the topic. 
 230. See White, supra note 164, at 758. 
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should ask if a judicial ruling has addressed the precise issue.231  When the 
reach of such precedent is not clear, the court should defer to the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of the precedent.232 
In our inquiry, after concluding above that neither section 10(b) nor Rule 
10b-5 addressed this precise issue, the next question is, did the Janus Court 
decide the precise issue:  Does the “ultimate authority” holding apply to all 
Rule 10b-5 actions?  If so, the Court’s interpretation has become a de facto 
part of the statute.233  If not, then the Court should proceed to Chevron Step 
Two234 (or, with an agency interpretation, a Seminole Rock analysis).  
Justice Scalia once wrote, “How clear is clear?  It is here [at Chevron Step 
One] that future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law 
will be fought.”235  The following subsections will discuss the debate over 
the scope of the Janus decision. 
a.  Yes:  The Court Decided the Scope of Rule 10b-5 for All Parties 
If Janus decided the scope of Rule 10b-5 for all parties,236 stare decisis 
bars the SEC from pursuing its alternative interpretation.237  An agency 
cannot simply reinterpret a rule after a court has determined its meaning.238 
When the Court declined to follow the SEC’s position set forth in its 
brief, the Court noted that the rule was not ambiguous.239  When lower 
courts have found that Janus applies, they have uniformly applied the 
“ultimate authority” standard to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5(b) enforcement 
claims.240 
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b.  No:  The Court’s Holding Is Limited to Private Actions 
It can be argued that the Court’s holding was limited to private rights of 
action and does not apply to SEC actions.241  Although Janus held that the 
rule was not ambiguous, merely concluding it is unambiguous does not 
make it so.  Judge Posner has written that “[a] text is clear if all or most 
persons, having the linguistic and cultural competence assumed by the 
authors of the text, would agree on its meaning.”242  Applying that logic, 
the text of Rule 10b-5 may not be as clear as Justice Thomas concluded.  
Indeed, the four dissenting justices disagreed that it was unambiguous.243  
Furthermore, several federal courts in pre-Janus cases also held that the 
SEC’s interpretation was reasonable.244  While the majority cited two 
dictionaries,245 the SEC cited other dictionaries that supported their 
interpretation.246  In addition, the majority’s reasoning, which relied on the 
text of the rule, was still heavily influenced by policy considerations for 
confining private litigation, considerations that are not and should not be 
considered in a public SEC enforcement action.247  Therefore, there is no 
precedent to which to adhere, a stare decisis challenge would be moot, and 
the analysis should proceed to Chevron Step Two. 
3.  Chevron Step Two/Seminole Rock:  Competing Interpretations 
of Rule 10b-5(b) 
Assuming that Janus does not apply, would the SEC’s interpretation be a 
permissible construction of the Rule? 
In SEC enforcement actions, the Supreme Court has directed lower 
courts to interpret section 10(b) of the ’34 Act “not technically and 
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”248  The 
statute was designed as a “catch-all”249 to prevent not only “garden type 
variet[ies] of fraud” but also “unique form[s] of deception” involving 
“[n]ovel or atypical methods.”250  This interpretive principle similarly 
applies to Rule 10b-5 actions,251 as the elements of the Rule and the statute 
are the same.  The question remains:  what is the proper interpretation of 
Rule 10b-5(b) to apply in an SEC enforcement action? 
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a.  Pre-Janus Cases:  The SEC’s Creation Standard 
The ’34 Act expressly gave the SEC authority to prescribe “rules and 
regulations . . . as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors” to enforce section 10(b).252  Shortly thereafter, the 
SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5.253  Through its experience with enforcing 
Rule 10b-5, the SEC formulated its interpretation of the rule that it applied 
when bringing enforcement actions—the creation standard.  Rule 10b-5(b) 
makes it unlawful for “any person, directly or indirectly” to “make any 
untrue statement of material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security.”254  According to the SEC, a person can create a statement 
when “the statement is written or spoken by him, or if he provides the false 
or misleading information that another person then puts into the statement, 
or if he allows the statement to be attributed to him.”255  The SEC has 
understood Rule 10b-5 to encompass untrue statements that are created by 
someone other than the nominal speaker since 1998, when it first formally 
expressed that view in an amicus brief.256  Primary liability will attach 
“when a person, acting alone or with others, [with the requisite scienter] 
creates a misrepresentation.”257  The SEC adopted this interpretation in a 
formal adjudication in 2005258 and has reiterated this view several times 
since.259  In SEC v. KPMG,260 a post–Central Bank case, the Southern 
District of New York found that an engagement partner at a public 
accounting firm could be liable for making misstatements in an audit 
opinion, despite not signing the opinion, assuming that he had the requisite 
scienter.261  The audit opinion gave “reasonable assurance” that Xerox’s 
financial statements were presented in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) when they were not.262  The court held that 
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the partner was “sufficiently responsible for” the opinion and, thus, 
primarily liable for “making” the misstatement if all the other elements of 
Rule 10b-5 were met.263  Finding that the requisite intent to defraud may be 
inferred from recklessness,264 the court applied a recklessness standard for 
the scienter requirement and held that mere misapplication of GAAP was 
insufficient.265  The court noted that this formulation covered a narrower 
scope of conduct than the “substantial participation” test.266 
b.  The Janus Decision 
While the majority opinion in Janus announced the narrow “ultimate 
authority” standard for private Rule 10b-5 claims, it is not clear if this 
standard also applies to SEC enforcement cases.267  Part III will attempt to 
resolve this question.  This section will describe the competing 
interpretations found in the Janus majority’s opinion, the SEC’s amicus 
brief, and the dissent’s opinion. 
i.  The Majority Opinion 
The majority held that “one ‘makes’ a statement by stating it.”268  The 
majority identified five main reasons for its narrow holding.  First, the court 
looked to the dictionary definition269 of “make.”270  Justice Thomas, 
writing for the Court, selected one definition and then engaged in a 
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grammatical exercise to explain his interpretation of “to make” (i.e., “one 
‘makes’ a statement by stating it”).271  Second, the Court said that the 
“ultimate authority” test followed from Central Bank, which prohibited 
private actions against those who provided substantial assistance in making 
the statement; accordingly, the Court did not want to blur the line between 
primary and secondary liability.272  Third, the Court cited Stoneridge, 
finding that, without ultimate authority, it would not be “necessary or 
inevitable” that any falsehood would be contained in the statement.273  
Fourth, the majority “decline[d] the invitation to disregard the corporate 
form” and hold JCM liable for misstatements in JIF’s prospectus.274  Fifth, 
the Court expressed the need to limit the implied private right of action.275 
ii.  The SEC’s Amicus Brief 
The SEC’s amicus brief in Janus described the history of the SEC’s 
creation standard, its grammatical interpretation of “make,” and practical 
responses to many of the concerns raised by the Janus majority.276  The 
SEC argued that its conclusion—that one can make a statement by “creating 
or writing it”—was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term 
“make.”277  Citing a variety of dictionary sources, the SEC laid out what it 
maintained to be reasonable grammatical interpretations of “make” as it was 
used for purposes of Rule 10b-5.278 
The SEC then refuted the speechwriter analogy advanced by the plaintiffs 
and accepted by the Court’s majority.  The majority stated, “even when a 
speech writer drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of 
the person who delivers it.  And it is the speaker who takes credit—or 
blame—for what is ultimately said.”279  The SEC argued that the analogy 
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was “doubly flawed.”280  First, the analogy refers to making a speech, 
which generally refers to an oral delivery by a single person at a specific 
point in time, while the JIF prospectuses were written documents 
disseminated through a variety of methods over a period of time.281  
Second, the prospectus was issued in the name of an artificial person, JIF, 
who “can act only through (and at the direction of) others.”282  Thus, “those 
who drafted the statements in the document can naturally be described as 
their maker.”283 
The SEC also argued that an investment adviser exercising day-to-day 
management over a mutual fund should be considered a primary, not 
secondary, actor.284  Unlike outside consultants, such as lawyers, 
accountants, and banks, mutual fund managers are actually responsible for 
the issuer’s statements.  Nonetheless, if an outside consultant were 
“sufficiently involved” in creating or disseminating the statement in the 
client’s name, that person may be said to have “made” the statement for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5.285  If such an interpretation did not apply to the 
conduct at issue, and JCM was not considered a “maker,” the SEC had 
grave concerns for its own ability to pursue even secondary liability claims 
because there would be no primary violation to aid and abet; thus, 
investment advisors who create false statements in their funds prospectuses 
would escape liability under section 10(b) altogether.286 
iii.  The Janus Dissent 
The Janus dissent, written by Justice Breyer, expressed similar concerns 
as the SEC and chipped away much of the majority’s rationale for the 
“ultimate authority” interpretation.  The dissent first addressed the 
majority’s grammatical exercise, arguing that the majority incorrectly 
interpreted “make” as it was used in Rule 10b-5(b), noting that the scope of 
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the word is in no way limited to “ultimate authority.”287  In contrast, the 
language and previous case law demonstrated that circumstances of the case 
determine whether one could make statements contained in a firm’s 
prospectus, even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related 
responsibility.288  Numerous people can and do make statements.289  The 
dissent also challenged the majority’s reliance on Central Bank, noting that 
Central Bank did not define primary liability but held merely that the text of 
section 10(b) did not provide for secondary liability.290  Unlike Central 
Bank, where the defendants did not make any statements, the defendant in 
Janus, JCM, did in fact make false statements.291  The dissent also refuted 
the majority’s citations to Stoneridge’s “necessary and inevitable” test.  The 
Stoneridge Court focused on whether investors could have relied on 
statements not made to the public.  In contrast, the Janus facts show that a 
statement was made to the public in the prospectus because of JCM’s 
conduct.  According to the dissent, the Court’s shift in focus from reliance 
to conduct made it difficult to see how Stoneridge supported an “ultimate 
authority” test.292  The dissent also expressed concern that there would be 
no primary violator if the majority’s opinion were followed, because a 
guilty management company, acting through an innocent board that 
officially made the statement, would not be liable.293  The dissent called 
this liability void the “13th stroke of the new rule’s clock”294  Finally, the 
dissent pointed out that corporate officials and others have been held liable 
under Rule 10b-5 for having made false statements in documents that they 
do not legally control.295  The dissent cited Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston,296 where the Court found that “certain individuals who play a 
part in preparing the registration statement” were primarily liable even 
where they are not named in the registration statement.297  The dissent also 
quoted Central Bank, where the Court found that “a lawyer, accountant, or 
bank, who . . . makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a 
particular purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary 
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violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability 
under Rule 10b-5 are met,” including the requisite scienter.298 
III.  LOOKING FORWARD:  “BY JANUS, I THINK NO”299 
The Janus decision was limited to private Rule 10b-5 actions and, as 
such, does not apply to SEC enforcement actions.  As a result, stare decisis 
should not block the SEC’s own interpretation.  The Janus interpretation of 
“to make” may be one permissible construction, but it is not the only one.  
The SEC’s creation standard is also a permissible construction of the Rule 
and is thereby entitled to substantial deference from courts.  The Janus 
Court’s concerns for blurring the line between primary and secondary 
liability are satisfied because, as demonstrated in SEC v. KPMG, the 
creation standard, premised on “sufficient responsibility,” is more exacting 
than the “substantial assistance” standard used for of aiding and abetting.  
The other policy reasons cited by the Court are not present in SEC 
enforcement actions, and, in contrast, there are policy factors in favor of 
deferring to the SEC; as a result, the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 need not 
be so narrow, and the SEC’s interpretation should be accorded deference 
under Seminole Rock. 
A.  Janus Does Not Apply to SEC 10b-5 Enforcement Actions 
The Janus holding was limited to private rights of action and, 
accordingly, does not apply to SEC actions.  Although the “ultimate 
authority” limitation might be necessary in a private suit, the considerations 
cited by the Court are not present in an SEC action.  First, the Court 
explained that it granted certiorari to determine whether, in a private action, 
the advisor could be liable for making misstatements.300  Second, if the 
proper interpretation merely turned on the dictionary definition of “make,” 
then the other rationale for the holding would be superfluous.  Instead, it is 
the other rationales that drive the selection of the narrow dictionary 
definition from a variety of options.  For example, the court twice 
highlights the need to accord a narrow interpretation to the implied private 
right of action.301  This may have been a valid consideration for implied 
actions in the face of ever-expanding private securities litigation that 
Congress might not have intended.302  There should be no corresponding 
concern in SEC actions, however, because they are expressly authorized in 
the statute.303  Unlike its private action guidance, the Court has repeatedly 
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instructed lower courts in SEC enforcement actions to interpret section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes.304 
In addition, the Court expressed concern for blurring the line between 
primary and secondary liability because private plaintiffs cannot bring 
aiding and abetting suits.305  In contrast, the SEC has express statutory 
authority to bring such claims,306 making such concerns unfounded in an 
SEC enforcement action. 
As the dissent and subsequent commentators point out, the SEC can only 
pursue control person liability and aiding and abetting when there is a 
primary violation.307  Under the majority’s view, there would be no primary 
violator for others to be secondarily liable for aiding and abetting.  While 
the SEC has other avenues to prosecute fraudulent activity,308 such an 
unnecessary limitation would impede the SEC’s ability to carry out its role 
in “safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws.”309  If 
the “ultimate authority” standard is in fact a “13th stroke” of a clock that 
never occurs,310 one must wonder if this could have been what Congress 
intended when it passed the ’34 Act and subsequent legislation. 
B.  The SEC’s Interpretation is Entitled to Judicial Deference 
This section will demonstrate why the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5 
is entitled to substantial judicial deference.  Starting with Mead, then going 
through the traditional “Chevron two-step,” the SEC’s interpretation passes 
each step set forth in the Court’s jurisprudence.  Had the Court considered 
the SEC’s interpretation in a separate proceeding that lacked concerns over 
implied private rights of action, the analysis would demand deference to the 
SEC’s position. 
1.  Mead/Chevron Step Zero 
The ’34 Act expressly delegated rulemaking authority to the SEC but is 
silent on the ability to interpret those rules.311  But this authority can surely 
be inferred as a function of enforcing such rules and regulations.  If the SEC 
expresses its interpretation in a formal adjudication, as it did in In re 
Armstrong,312 it will pass the initial Mead test.  Nonetheless, other 
proceedings that “foster . . . fairness and deliberation” could also be 
indicators of Congressional intent to delegate “force of law” authority.313  
In Auer, the Court stated that an agency’s amicus brief reflected the 
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agency’s fair and considered judgment.314  The SEC has set forth its 
interpretation in several amicus briefs since 1998.315  Thus, there is no 
doubt that the SEC’s process for developing its interpretation passes Step 
Zero. 
2.  Neither Congress nor the Court Spoke Directly to This Issue:  
Passing Chevron Step One. 
For many of the same reasons expressed in Part III.A, the Janus ruling 
should not set precedent for an SEC action, and therefore, neither Congress 
nor the Court has spoken to this direct issue.  When the reach of the Court’s 
holding is not clear, courts should not cut off the analysis,316 particularly 
when it considers the policy reasons for agency deference.317 
In the present case, Congress has not spoken, so the analysis turns to 
whether the Court has spoken to the precise question at issue.318  If not, 
then the Court should not impose its own construction.319  In Janus, the 
Court did not expressly hold that the ultimate authority rule applies in SEC 
enforcement actions,320 so the analysis should proceed to Chevron Step 
Two. 
3.  A Practical Construction:  Passing Chevron Step Two 
The majority’s interpretation does not have to be the only reasonable 
construction.  One reasonable construction does not preclude all other 
reasonable constructions, especially in the realm of agency interpretations.  
The Court itself has stated that an agency’s interpretation need not be the 
best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards.321  The Court 
has also repeatedly instructed lower courts to interpret section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its 
remedial purposes.”322  The majority in Janus gave Rule 10b-5 “narrow 
dimensions” because of the party bringing the case;323 likewise, one can 
infer that there are “broader” interpretations available—but not used—such 
as the SEC’s interpretation. 
Four Supreme Court Justices, several lower court judges, and several 
commentators have also offered alternative, yet reasonable interpretations 
of “to make.”324  The dissent argued that the English language does not 
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impose limitations such as “ultimate authority” on the word “make.”325  
While the majority cited dictionary definitions as support,326 the SEC cited 
different dictionary definitions to support its position.327 Surely, the scope 
of one of the most important federal securities laws should not turn on 
which dictionary one pulls from the library shelf.328  Such disagreement 
over the meaning demonstrates that the text of Rule 10b-5 is far from 
“clear.”329  When the answer is not clear, the uncertainty should yield to an 
agency’s own reasonable interpretation, consistent with Congress’s will to 
delegate such authority. 
Additionally, the SEC has used the “creation” standard since 1998.330  
Courts should not disturb the agency’s “longstanding interpretation of its 
own regulations.”331  Nor should a court interpose its own construction 
when the SEC’s expertise is more adept at dealing with the complex nature 
of mutual fund structures, market transactions, and unique or novel forms of 
fraud.332 
The cases cited in Part I.B.2, discussing possible limits on Seminole Rock 
deference, deal with a court’s ruling on an agency’s action, followed later 
by a changed agency interpretation.333  It would be fair to argue that an 
agency should not get two bites at the apple or be given the unchecked 
power simply to change its interpretation or to overturn a Supreme Court 
decision.334  In any event, this would not be the case in a post-Janus SEC 
action.  The SEC never got a full bite.  As an amicus, it offered its opinion, 
which the Court was not obligated to follow; the SEC was not a party to the 
suit.  However, the SEC was never afforded a chance to present its 
interpretation insulated from inapplicable policy considerations for limiting 
private actions.  Were the SEC afforded an opportunity, it could present its 
interpretation, and, independent of private actions, a court could decide if 
that interpretation was a “practical construction” of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 consistent with Congressional intent. 
The only limitation that should be placed on the scope of Rule 10b-5 in 
an SEC enforcement action is the text of the statute.335  Unlike Rule 10b-5, 
section 10(b) does not include the word “make,” but instead lists “use or 
employ.”  Such words encompass a broader range of conduct,336 including 
that of JCM.  Accountants, lawyers, bankers, underwriters, and others who 
unknowingly create misleading documents will not be liable if they, as the 
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board of JIF did, lacked the requisite scienter, or intent to deceive.337  It 
should be difficult to formulate the policy argument that those who act with 
an intent to deceive should be excluded from the scope of Rule 10b-5, as 
JCM was.  Instead, as proposed by the Janus dissent and consistent with 
pre-Janus precedents, a court should undertake a broader inquiry, beyond 
“ultimate authority,” into matters of context, control, participation, and 
relevant audience to determine who makes a statement for purpose of Rule 
10b-5.338 
CONCLUSION 
The text of Rule 10b-5 has not changed since Milton Freeman wrote it in 
1942.  In contrast, the securities industry today would be almost 
unrecognizable to those from that early period of federal securities law.  
Although the industry is evolving every minute, with new products, 
markets, fund structures, and means of communication, the text of Rule 
10b-5 has, so far, been sufficiently flexible to cover these evolutions.339  
The SEC, charged with the monumental task of not only promulgating rules 
to keep up with such change but also enforcing those rules to “protect[] 
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation,” must be allowed the flexibility to use every possible tool at its 
disposal to “effect the remedial purpose” of our nations securities laws.340  
That flexibility encompasses the ability to interpret its own regulation in a 
reasonable and practical manner designed to keep up with the ever-
changing market and root out fraud wherever it is found. 
After all, “[W]e are against fraud, aren’t we?”341 
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